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Abstract—We consider the problem of streaming live content
to a cluster of co-located wireless devices that have both an
expensive unicast base-station-to-device (B2D) interface, as well
as an inexpensive broadcast device-to-device (D2D) interface,
which can be used simultaneously. Our setting is a streaming
system that uses a block-by-block random linear coding approach
to achieve a target percentage of on-time deliveries with minimal
B2D usage. Our goal is to design an incentive framework that
would promote such cooperation across devices, while ensuring
good quality of service. Based on ideas drawn from truth-telling
auctions, we design a mechanism that achieves this goal via
appropriate transfers (monetary payments or rebates) in a setting
with a large number of devices, and with peer arrivals and
departures. Here, we show that a Mean Field Game can be used to
accurately approximate our system. Furthermore, the complexity
of calculating the best responses under this regime is low. We
implement the proposed system on an Android testbed, and
illustrate its efficient performance using real world experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has recently been much interest in networked systems
for collaborative resource utilization. These are systems in
which agents contribute to the overall welfare through their
individual actions. Usually, each agent has a certain amount
of resources, and can choose how much to contribute based on
the perceived return via repeated interactions with the system.
An example is a peer-to-peer file sharing network, wherein
each peer can contribute upload bandwidth by transmitting
chunks to a peer, and receive downloads of chunks from that
peer as a reward. Interactions are bilateral, and hence tit-for-tat
type strategies are successful in preventing free-riding behavior
[1]. More generally, collaborative systems entail multilateral
interactions in which the actions of each agent affect and are
affected by the collective behavior of a subset of agents. Here,
more complex mechanisms are needed to accurately determine
the value of the contribution of each individual to the group.
An example of a collaborative system with repeated multi-
lateral interactions is a device-to-device (D2D) wireless net-
work. Suppose that multiple devices require the same content
chunk. The broadcast nature of the wireless medium implies
that several agents can be simultaneously satisfied by a single
transmission. However, they might each have different values
for that particular chunk, and may have contributed different
amounts in the past to the transmitting agent. Furthermore,
D2D systems undergo “churn” in which devices join and leave
different clusters as they move around. How then is an agent
to determine whether to collaborate with others, and whether
it has received a fair compensation for its contribution?
Our objective in this paper is to design mechanisms for
cooperation in systems with repeated multilateral interactions.
As in earlier literature, we assume that there exists a currency
to transfer utility between agents [2], [3], and our goal is
to determine how much should be transferred for optimal
collaboration. We focus on wireless content streaming as our
motivating example. In particular, as shown in Figure 1, we
assume that all devices are interested in the same content
stream, and receive a portion of chunks corresponding to this
stream via a unicast base-station-to-device (B2D) interface.
The B2D interface has a large energy and dollar cost for usage,
and the devices seek to mitigate this cost via sharing chunks
through broadcast D2D communication.1
Internet
Fig. 1. Wireless content distribution via multiple interfaces [4].
A content sharing system is described in [4], in which the
objective is to achieve live streaming of content synchronously
to multiple co-located devices. The system architecture of that
work forms an ideal setting for studying mechanism design in
which multilateral interactions occur. The setup is illustrated
in Figure 2. Here, time is divided into frames, which are
subdivided into T slots. A block of data is generated by the
content server in each frame, and the objective is to ensure that
this block can be played out by all devices two frames after its
generation, i.e., data block k is generated in frame k− 2, and
is to be played out in frame k. Such a strict delay constraint
between the time of generation and playout of each data block
ensures that the live aspect of streaming is maintained.
1Note that, as we describe in greater detail later in this paper, it is possible
to enable the usage of both the 3G (unicast) and WiFi (broadcast) interfaces
simultaneously on Android smart phones.
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Fig. 2. Streaming architecture [4] in which each block must be delivered
within two frames after its creation.
Upon generation of block k (in frame k − 2), the content
server divides it into N chunks and performs random linear
coding (RLC) over these chunks [5]. The server unicasts some
of these coded chunks to each device using its B2D interface.
This number is to be kept small to reduce B2D usage. Next,
in frame k − 1, the devices use the broadcast D2D network
to disseminate these chunks among themselves. At the end of
frame k−1 the devices attempt to decode block k. If a device
i has received enough coded chunks to decode the block, it
plays out that block during frame k. Otherwise, i will be idle
during this frame. The use of RLC results in two desirable
system features. First, the server can unicast a fixed number
of chunks to the devices in each frame over a lossy channel
(Internet plus B2D link) without any feedback. Second, the
devices do not need to keep track of what chunks each one
possesses while performing D2D broadcasts.
The notion of quality of experience (QoE) here is delivery-
ratio denoted by η, which is the average ratio of blocks
desired to the blocks generated [6]. For instance, a delivery
ratio of 95% would mean that it is acceptable if 5% of the
blocks can be skipped. A device can keep track of its QoE
thus far via the “deficit” incurred upto frame k, which is the
difference between the actual number of number of blocks
successfully decoded by frame k and the target value ηk. In
[4], it was shown that, assuming complete cooperation by the
participating devices, it is possible to design a chunk sharing
scheme whereby all devices would meet their QoE targets with
minimal usage of the B2D interface. But how do we design a
mechanism to ensure that the devices cooperate?
The setting of interest in this paper is that of a large number
of D2D clusters, each with a fixed number of agents, and with
all clusters interested in the same content stream. Examples of
such settings are sports stadia, concerts or protest meetings,
where a large number of agents gather together, and desire to
receive the same live-stream (replays, commentary, live video
etc.) Devices move between clusters as agents move around,
causing churn. The objective of our work is to develop an
incentive framework wherein each device truthfully reports the
number of chunks that it receives via B2D and its deficit in
each frame, so that a system-wide optimal allocation policy
can be employed. Such an incentive framework should be
lightweight and compatible with minimal amounts of history
retention. Finally, we also desire to implement the system on
Android smart phones and measure its real world performance.
Related Work
The question of how to assign value to wireless broad-
cast transmissions is intriguing. For instance, [7] considers a
problem of repeated interaction with time deadlines by which
each node needs to receive a packet. Each node declares its
readiness to help others after waiting for a while; the game
lies in choosing this time optimally, and the main result is
to characterize the price of anarchy that results. However,
decision making is myopic, i.e., devices do not estimate future
states while taking actions. In a similar fashion, [3] propose
a scheme for sharing 3G services via WiFi hotspots using
a heuristic scheme that possesses some attractive properties.
Here too, decision making is myopic. The question of fair
scheduling at a base station that uses the history of interactions
with individual stations in order to identify whether they are
telling the truth about their state is considered in [8]. However,
since the devices in our network undergo churn and keeping
track of device identities is infeasible, we desire a scheme that
does not use identities or history to enable truthful revelation
of state. The initial version of this work was presented in [9]
in which all proofs were omitted due to space constraints. This
paper presents complete details of the analytical methodology.
Perfect Bayesian and Mean Field Equilibria: The typical
solution concept in dynamic games is that of the Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Consider a strategy profile for
all players, as well as beliefs about the other players’ types
at all information sets. This strategy profile and belief system
is a PBE if: (i) Sequential rationality: Each player’s strategy
specifies optimal actions, given her beliefs and the strategies
of other players; (ii) Consistency of beliefs: Each player’s
belief is consistent with the strategy profile (following Bayes’
rule). The PBE requires each agent to keep track of their
beliefs on the future plays of all other agents in the system,
and play the best response to that belief. The dynamic pivot
mechanism [10] extends the truth-telling VCG idea [11] to
dynamic games. It provides a basis for designing allocation
schemes that are underpinned by truthful reporting. Translating
the model in [8] to the language of [10], it is possible to
use the dynamic pivot mechanism to develop a scheme (say
FiniteDPM) with appropriate transfers that will be efficient,
dominant strategy incentive compatible and per-period indi-
vidually rational; note that while this scheme would use the
identities of the devices, it will not need to build up a history
of interactions. We omit the details of this as it is a straight-
forward application of the general theory from [10].
Computation of PBE becomes intractable when the number
of agents is large. An accurate approximation of the Bayesian
game in this regime is that of a Mean Field Game (MFG) [12]–
[14]. In MFG, the agents assume that each opponent would
play an action drawn independently from a static distribution
over its action space. The agent chooses an action that is the
best response against actions drawn in this fashion. The system
is said to be at Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if this best
response action is itself a sample drawn from the assumed
distribution, i.e., the assumed distribution and the best response
action are consistent with each other [15]–[17]. Essentially,
this is the canonical problem in game theory of showing the
existence of a Nash equilibrium, as it applies to the regime
with a large number of agents. We will use this concept in
our setting where there are a large number of peer devices
with peer churn.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work that
considers mechanism design for multilateral repeated games
in the mean field setting. One of the important contributions
of this paper is in providing a truth-telling mechanism for a
mean-field game. In the process of developing the mechanism
we will also highlight the nuances to be considered in the
mean-field setting. In particular, we will see that aligning two
concepts of value—from the system perspective and from that
of the agents—is crucial to our goal of truth-telling.
Organization and Main Results
We describe our system model in Section II. Our system
consists of a large number of clusters, with agents moving
between clusters. The lifetime of an agent is geometric; an
agent is replaced with a new one when it exits. Each agent
receives a random number of B2D chunks by the beginning
of each frame, which it then shares using D2D transmissions.
In Section III, we present an MFG approximation of the
system, which is accurate when the number of clusters is
large. Here, the agents assume that the B2D chunks received
and deficits of the other agents would be drawn independently
from some distributions in the future, and optimize against
that assumption when declaring their states. The objective is
to incentivize agents to truthfully report their states (B2D
chunks and deficit) such that a schedule of transmissions
(called an “allocation”) that minimizes the discounted sum
of costs can be used in each frame. The mechanism takes
the form of a scheme in which tokens are used to transfer
utility between agents. A nuance of this regime is that while
the system designer sees each cluster as having a new set
of users (with IID states) in each time frame, each user sees
states of all its competitors but not itself as satisfying the
mean field distribution. Reconciling the two view points is
needed to construct a cost minimizing pivot mechanism, whose
truth-telling nature is shown in Section IV. This is our main
contribution in this paper. The allocation itself turns out to be
computationally simple, and follows a version of a min-deficit
first policy [4].
Next, in Sections V–VI, we present details on how to
prove the existence of the MFE in our setting. Although this
proof is quite involved, it follows in a high-level sense in the
manner of [15], [16]. We then turn to computing the MFE
and the value functions needed to determine the transfers in
Section VIII. The value iteration needed to choose allocation
is straightforward.
We present details of our Android implementation of a
music streaming app used to collect real world traces in
Section IX. We discuss the viability of our system in Section
X, and illustrate that under the current price of cellular data
access, our system provides sufficient incentives to participate.
Finally, we conclude in Section XI.
II. CONTENT STREAMING MODEL
We consider a large number of D2D clusters, each with
a fixed number of agents, and with all clusters interested in
the same content stream. We assume that a cluster consists of
M co-located peer devices denoted by i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2. The
data source generates the stream in the form of a sequence
of blocks. Each block is further divided into N chunks for
transmission. We use random linear network coding over the
chunks of each block (with coefficients in finite field Fq of size
q). We assume that the field size is very large; this assumption
can be relaxed without changing our cooperation results. Time
is divided into frames, which are further divided into slots. At
each time slot τ , each device can simultaneously receive up
to one chunk on each interface.
B2D Interface: Each device has a (lossy) B2D unicast chan-
nel to a base-station. For each device i, we model the number
of chunks received using the B2D interface in the previous
frame by a random variable with (cumulative) distribution ζ,
independent of the other devices. The support of ζ is the set
{0, 1, · · · , T}, denoted by T. The statistics of this distribution
depend on the number of chunks transmitted by the server
and the loss probability of the channel. In [4], a method for
calculating statistics based on the desired quality of service is
presented. We take the distribution ζ as given.
D2D Interface: Each device has a zero-cost D2D broadcast
interface, and only one device can broadcast over the D2D
network at each time τ . For simplicity of exposition, we will
assume that the D2D broadcasts are always successful; the
more complex algorithm proposed in [4] to account for unreli-
able D2D is fully consistent3 with our incentive scheme. Since
each D2D broadcast is received by all devices, there is no
need to rebroadcast any information. It is then straightforward
to verify that the order of D2D transmissions does not impact
performance. Thus, we only need to keep track of the number
of chunks transmitted over the D2D interfaces during a frame
in order to determine the final state of the system.
Allocation: We denote the total number of coded chunks
of block k delivered to device i via the B2D network during
frame k − 2 using ei[k] ∼ ζ. We call the vector consisting
of the number of transmissions by each device via the D2D
interfaces over frame k − 1 as the “allocation” pertaining
to block k, denoted by a[k]. Also, we denote the number
received chunks of block k by device i via D2D during frame
k − 1 using gi[k]. Due to the large field size assumption, if
ei[k] + gi[k] = N, it means that block k can be decoded,
and hence can be played out. For simplicity of exposition, we
develop our results assuming that the allocation is computed
in a centralized fashion in each cluster. However, we actually
2Our analysis is essentially unchanged when there are a random but finite
number of devices in each cluster.
3We will discuss this at the end of Section VI.
implement a distributed4 version on the testbed.
Quality of Experience: Each device i has a delivery ratio
ηi ∈ (0, 1], which is the minimum acceptable long-run average
number of frames device i must playout. In the mobile agents
model, we assume that all devices have the same delivery ratio
η for simplicity. It is straightforward to extend our results to
the case where delivery ratios are drawn from some finite set
of values. The device keeps track of the current deficit using a
deficit queue with length di[k] ∈ K. The set of possible deficit
values is given by K =
{
kη − m : k,m ≥ 0,m ≤ bkηc},
where for x ∈ R, bxc = max{k ∈ Z : k ≤ x} is the largest
whole number that x is greater than. Note that K is a countable
set and the possible deficit values are all non-negative. In
fact, by the well-ordering principle K can be rewritten as
{dn}n∈N with dn an increasing sequence (without bound) such
that d1 = 0. We will use this representation to enumerate
the elements of K. If a device fails to decode a particular
block, its deficit increases by η, else it decreases by 1 − η.
The impact of deficit on the user’s quality of experience is
modeled by a function c(di[k]), which is convex, differentiable
and monotone increasing. The idea is that user unhappiness
increases more with each additional skipped block.
Transfers: We asume the existence of a currency (either
internal or a monetary value) that can be used to transfer utility
between agents [2], [3]. In our system, a negative transfer is
a price paid by the agent, while a positive value indicates
that the agent is paid by the system. Such transfer systems are
well established; see for instance a review in [2]. Transfers are
used by agents either to pay for value received through others’
transmissions, or to be compensated for value added to others
by transmitting a chunk. We assume that the transmissions in
the system are monitored by a reliable device, which can then
report these values to decide on the transfers. In practice we
use the device that creates each ad-hoc network as the monitor.
An allocation policy maps the values of the B2D chunks
received and deficits as revealed by agents, denoted by θˆ[k] :=
(eˆ[k], dˆ[k − 1]), to an allocation for that frame a[k]. Given
an allocation, agents have no incentive to deviate from it,
since an agent that does not transmit the allocated number of
chunks would see no benefit; those time slots would have no
transmissions by other agents either. The fundamental question
is that of how to incentivize the agents to reveal their states
truthfully so that the constructed allocation can maximize
system-wide welfare.
III. MEAN FIELD MODEL AND MECHANISM DESIGN
Our system consists of JM agents (or users) organized
into J clusters with M agents per cluster. As mentioned
earlier, time is slotted into frames. At the end of a frame,
any agent i can leave the system only to be replaced by a
new agent (also denoted by i) whose initial deficit is drawn
from a (cumulative) distribution Ψ with support K. This event
occurs with probability δ¯ = (1 − δ) independently for each
4At the end of Section VI we will argue that the distributed implementation
is also consistent with our incentive scheme.
agent, so that the lifetimes of the agents are geometrically
distributed. As described in the previous section, we assume
that the number of chunks received via B2D for agent i
in frame k, denoted by ei[k], is chosen in an i.i.d. fashion
according to the (cumulative) distribution ζ, with support T;
one such distribution is the binomial distribution. In addition
to the agents having geometrically distributed lifetimes, we
also allow mobility in our set-up. In particular, in every frame
we assume that all the agents are randomly permuted and then
assigned to clusters such that there are exactly M agents in
each cluster. Using this system as a starting point we will
develop our mean-field model that will be applicable when
the number of clusters J is extremely large.
The mean field framework in Figure 3 illustrates system
relationships that will be discussed below. The blue/dark
tiles apply to the value determination process for mechanism
design, which will be discussed in this section. The beige/light
tiles are relevant to showing the existence of an MFE on
which the mechanism depends, which will be discussed in
Sections V–VI.
Decode&&
or&not&
Sta,onary&
Distribu,on&&&&
.&
B2D&Arrivals&
Transfer&
Value&from&cluster&view&
Value&from&agent&1&view&
Next&
state&
Revealed&
state&
Regenera,on&
Distribu,on&
[⌦⇢M 1,
⌦⇣M 1] ⇥ˆ 1
c(d)
⇧⇢⇥⇣
⇣
⇥1
Assumed&
future&&
distribu,on&
of&other&
agents& Revealed&state&
of&other&agents&
Deficit&cost&  1(a, ✓)
 
aTrue&
state& ✓ˆ 1✓ˆ1✓1
Alloca,on&
Wˆ , W˜
p⇤(✓ˆ1, ✓ˆ 1)
Fig. 3. The Mean Field system from perspective of agent 1.
The mean field model yields informational and computa-
tional savings, since otherwise each agent will need to not
only be cognizant of the values and actions of all agents, but
also track their mobility patterns. Additionally, the mean field
distribution accounts for regenerations, which do not have to
be explicitly accounted for when determining best responses.
There is, however, an important nuance that the mean-field
analysis introduces: when there are a large number of clusters,
each cluster sees a different group of agents in every frame
with their states drawn from the mean-field distribution, but
even though each agent interacts with a new set of agents in
every frame, it’s own state is updated based on the allocations
made to it, so that the differing viewpoints of the two entities
need to be reconciled while providing any incentives.
The number of chunks received over the B2D interface
and the deficit value constitute the state of an agent at the
beginning of a frame. At frame k we collect together the state
variables of all the agents in system as θ[k] = (e[k],d[k−1]).
Our mechanism then aims to achieve
W (θ[k]) = min
{a[l]}∞
l=k
E

J∑
j=1
∞∑
l=k
δl−k
∑
i∈sj [l]
vi(asj [l], θi[l])
 ,
(1)
where j = 1, 2, · · · , J is the number of clusters in the system,
sj [k] is the set of agents in cluster j at frame k, asj is the
allocation in cluster j and vi(asj [l], θi[l]) is the value that
agent i makes from the allocation in frame k. For agent i set
ji[k] to be the cluster he belongs in during frame k, i.e., i ∈
sji[k][k]. Note that the probability of remaining in the system
δ appears as the discount factor in the above expression.
Given the allocation in each cluster, if agent i does not
regenerate, then his deficit gets updated as
di[k] = (di[k − 1] + η − χi(aji[k][k], θi[k]))+, (2)
where (·)+ = max(·, 0), whereas if the agent regenerates, then
di[k] = d˜i[k] where d˜i[k] is drawn i.i.d. with distribution Ψ.
Here,
χi(a, θi) = 1{ei+gi(a)=N} =
{
1 if ei + gi(a) = N
0 otherwise,
(3)
where χi(.) is 1 if and only if agent i obtains all N coded
chunks to be able to decode a block, gi(a) is the number
of packets agent i can get during a frame under the allo-
cation a (where we suppress the dependence of a on θ).
We specialize to the case where the value per frame for
agent i with system state θ and vector of allocations a is
given by vi(a, θi) = c
((
di + η − χi(a, θi)
)+)
if there is no
regeneration and vi(a,θi) = c(d˜i) otherwise, where d˜i is i.i.d.
with distribution Ψ and c(·) is the holding cost function that
is assumed to be convex and monotone increasing.
As there are a large number of clusters, in every frame
there is a completely different set of agents that appear at
any given cluster. The revealed states of these agents will
be drawn from the mean field distribution. Hence, from the
perspective of some cluster l, the revealed state of the agents
in that cluster Θˆl will be drawn according to the (cumulative)
distributions [⊗ρM ,⊗ζM ], with ρ pertaining to the deficit, and
ζ pertaining to the B2D transmissions received by that agent.
Note that the support of ρ is K while the support of ζ is T,
and ⊗ indicates the i.i.d nature of the agent states. Whereas
from the perspective a particular agent i, the revealed states
of all the other agents in that cluster will be drawn according
to Θˆ−i ∼ [⊗ρM−1,⊗ζM−1]. These facts will simplify the
allocation problem in each cluster and also allow us to analyze
the MFE by tracking a particular agent.
First, we consider the allocation problem as seen by the
clusters. Pick any finite number of clusters. In the mean-field
limit, the agents from frame to frame will be different in each
cluster, therefore the allocation decision in each cluster can
be made in an distributed manner, independent of the other
clusters; this is one of the chaos hypotheses of the mean-field
model. This then implies that the objective in (1) is achieved
by individual optimization in each cluster, i.e.,
W (θˆ[k]) =
J∑
j=1
Wj(θˆsj [k]), (4)
where we recall that θˆsj [k] is the revealed state of agents in
cluster j at time k and
Wj(θˆsj [k]) = min{asj [l]}∞l=k
∞∑
l=k
δl−k
∑
i∈sj [l]
vi(asj [l], θˆi[l]). (5)
Under mean field assumption, the method of determining value
does not change from step-to-step. The value function in the
mean-field is determined by the first solving the following
Bellman equation
Wˆ (θˆ) = min
a
M∑
i=1
vi(a, θˆi) + δE
{
Wˆ (Θˆ)
}
(6)
to obtain function Wˆ (·), where θˆ is the M -dimensional
revealed state vector (with elements θˆi) and the future re-
vealed state vector Θˆ is chosen according to [⊗ρM ,⊗ζM ],
and thereafter setting Wj(θˆsj [k]) = Wˆ (θˆsj [k]) for every
j = 1, 2, . . . , J . This observation then considerably simplifies
the allocation in each cluster to be the greedy optimal, i.e.,
determine (multi)function
a∗(θˆ) = arg min
a
M∑
i=1
vi(a, θˆi), (7)
and for j = 1, 2, . . . , J we set a∗sj = a
∗(θˆj).
Next, we consider the system from the viewpoint of a typical
agent i; w.l.o.g let i = 1. Any allocation results in the deficit
changing according to (2) and the future B2D packets drawn
according to ζ, whereas the state of every other agent that
agent 1 interacts with in the future gets chosen according to
the mean field distribution. Then the value function (of the
cluster) from the perspective of agent 1 is determined using
W˜ (1, (θˆ1, θˆ−1)) =
min
a
M∑
i′=1
vi′(a, θˆi′) + δE
{
W˜ (1, (Θˆ1, Θˆ−1))|a, θˆ1
}
.
(8)
Here, θˆ−1 represents the revealed states of all the agents in
cluster except 1, Θˆ−1 ∼ [⊗ρM−1,⊗ζM−1], and for Θˆ1, the
deficit term is determined via (2) (setting θi = θˆi) while the
B2D term follows ζ. This recursion yields a function W˜ (1, ·)
which applies to all agents. Using this function, one can also
determine the allocation that agent 1 expects his cluster to
perform, namely,
a˜(θˆ1, θˆ−1) =
arg min
a
M∑
i′=1
vi′(a, θˆi′) + δE
{
W˜ (1, (Θˆ1, Θˆ−1))|a, θˆ1
}
.
(9)
Using the two allocations a∗ and a˜ we can write down the
value of agent 1 from the system optimal allocation and the
value of agent 1 in the allocation that the agent thinks that the
system will be performing. For a given allocation function a(·)
(for the state of agents in the cluster where agent 1 resides at
present), we determine the solution to the following recursion
V (a(θˆ), θ˜1) = v1(a, θ˜1) + δE
{
V (a(Θˆ1, Θˆ−1), Θ˜1)
}
(10)
to get function V (·, ·), where θ˜1, is an arbitrary state variable,
the deficit term of Θ˜1 follows (2) while the B2D term is
generated independently (setting θi = θ˜i), a is an arbitrary
allocation, the B2D term is generated independently, and Θˆ−1
is chosen using the mean-field distribution. Notice that θ˜1 = θ1
would yield the true value of allocation a to agent 1. By
the cluster optimal allocation (what the cluster actually does),
agent 1 gets V (a∗(θˆ1, θˆ−1), θ1) whereas from the perception
of agent 1 he thinks he should be getting V (a˜(θˆ1, θˆ−1), θ1)
(based on what he thinks the cluster should be doing).
Transfer
We will use the different value functions to define the
transfer for agent 1 depending on the reported state variable
θˆ1 such that the transfer depends on the difference between
what he gets from the system optimal allocation and what he
expects the system to do from his own perspective. Using this
logic we set the transfer for agent 1 as
p∗(θˆ1, θˆ−1) = V (a∗(θˆ), θˆ1)− V (a˜(θˆ), θˆ1)
+H(θˆ−1)− (W˜ (1, (θˆ1, θˆ−1))− V (a˜(θˆ), θˆ1)).
(11)
where H(θˆ−1), following the Groves pivot mechanism, can
be chosen using the recursion
H(θˆ−1) = min
a−1
∑
i 6=1
vi(a−1, θˆi) + δE
{
H(Θˆ−1)
}
, (12)
where Θˆ−1 ∼ [⊗ρM−1,⊗ζM−1], and a−1 is used to denote
an allocation in a system in which agent 1 is not present.
The Clarke pivot mechanism idea ensures that the
net-cost of agent 1, V (a∗(θˆ), θˆ1) − p∗(θˆ1, θˆ−1), equals
W˜ (1, (θˆ1, θˆ−1)) − H(θˆ−1). This is simply the value of the
system as a whole from the viewpoint of agent 1, minus
a function only of θˆ−1. As in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism, such formulation of net-cost naturally promotes
truth-telling as a dominant strategy at each step.
Allocation Scheme
The basic building block of our mechanism is the per-frame
optimal allocations that solve (1). We will now spell out the
allocation in greater detail. First, we observe that the allocation
problem separates into independent allocation problems in
each cluster that have the same basic structure. Therefore, it
suffices to discuss the allocation problem for one cluster.
From (7), the objective in this cluster is
min
a
M∑
i=1
c((di[k − 1] + η − χi(a[k], θi[k]))+) (13)
An optimal allocation is determined using the following
observations. First, we partition the agents into two sets, ones
who cannot decode the frame even if they never transmit
during the T slots of the D2D phase and the rest; the former
agents are made to transmit first. After this we determine
agents who have extra chunks (number of slots that they can
transmit on such that there is still time to decode whole frame)
and make these agents transmit their extra chunks. After all
the extra chunks have been transmitted, it is easy to see using
the properties of the holding cost function that agents are
made to transmit in a minimum-deficit-first fashion in order
to prioritize agents with large deficits. This is summarized in
the follow lemma.
Lemma 1: The algorithm delineated in Algorithm 1 provides
an optimal greedy allocation.
Proof: Given the B2D arrivals (e1[k], ..., eM [k]), we
partition the set of devices {1, ...,M} into sets S and Sc =
{1, ...,M}\S, based on whether ei[k] + T − N ≥ 0 or not.
Those agents that satisfy this condition can potentially receive
enough chunks during the D2D phase that they can decode the
block, whereas the others cannot. Hence, all members of Sc
can potentially transmit their chunks in the allocation solving
(13). Let T1 = min{
∑
i∈Sc ei[k], T}. So we can devote the
first T1 slots of the current frame to transmissions from the
devices in Sc.
Let the number of transmissions made by agent i in alloca-
tion a be denoted by xi[k]. We can write down the constraints
that any feasible allocation a must satisfy as
0 ≤ xi[k] ≤ ei[k] ∀ i ∈ S∑
i∈S xi[k] = T − T1
(14)
Observe that each agent can transmit ei[k] + T − N chunks
without affecting the above constraints (i.e., it does not change
its chances of being able to decode the block, as there is
enough time left for it to receive chunks that it requires). We
call these as “extra” chunks. Suppose that all extra chunks
have been transmitted by time T2 < T, and no device has yet
reached full rank. At this point, all agents in the system need
the same number of chunks, and any agent that transmits a
chunk will not be able to receive enough chunks to decode
the block. In other words, agents now have to “sacrifice”
themselves one at a time, and transmit all their chunks. The
question is, what is the order in which such sacrifices should
take place?
Compare two agents i and j, with deficits di > dj . Also,
let χ ∈ {0, 1}. Now, for either value of χ
di − (di − χ)+ ≥ dj − (dj − χ)+.
Hence, since c(.) is convex and monotone increasing,∫ di
(di−χ)+
c′(z)dz ≥
∫ dj
(dj−χ)+
c′(z)dz ≥ 0 (15)
⇒ c(di)− c((di − χ)+) ≥ c(dj)− c((dj − χ)+) ≥ 0.
(16)
Now, consider the following problem with χi, χj ∈ {0, 1}
under the constraint χi + χj = 1 :
min
χi,χj
c(di − χi) + c(dj − χj). (17)
⇔ max
χi,χj
c(di)− c(di − χi) + c(dj)− c(dj − χj). (18)
Then, from the above discussion, the solution is to set χi = 1
and χj = 0. Thus, comparing (17) and (13), the final stage
of the allocation should be for agents to sacrifice themselves
according to a min-deficit-first type policy. Algorithm 1 de-
scribes the final allocation rule.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Mean Field D2D Allocation Rule
At the beginning of each frame k − 1, given the arrivals
(e1[k], ..., eM [k]):
Partition the devices into sets S = {i ∈ {1, ...,M} : N −
ei[k] ≤ T, ei[k] +
∑
j 6=i ej [k] ≥ N} and Sc.
If S = ∅, none of the agents can decode the block. Else,
Phase 1) Let all the agents in Sc transmit all that they
initially received for the next T1 = min{
∑
i∈Sc
ei[k], T} slots.
If there exists time and a need for more transmissions,
Phase 2) Let each agent i ∈ S transmit up to (ei[k] + T −
N)+ of its initial chunks.
Phase 3) While there exists time and a need for more
transmissions, let devices in S transmit their remaining
chunks in an increasing order of their deficit values.
IV. PROPERTIES OF MECHANISM
A. Truth-telling as dominant strategy
Since we consider a mean-field setting, we will assume that
deficit of agent i changes via the allocation while the deficits
of all the other agents are drawn using the given distribution
ρ. The e values are generated i.i.d. with distribution ζ. Based
on the system state report θ[k] at time k, we assume that the
mechanism makes the optimal greedy allocation a∗[k] from (7)
and levies transfers p∗[k] from (11) that uses the allocations
from the agent’s perspective from (9). We can then show that
truthfully revealing the state, i.e., (d, e) values at the beginning
of every frame is incentive compatible.
Definition 1: A direct mechanism (or social choice function)
f = (a, p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible if θi is
a dominant strategy at θi for each i and θi ∈ Θi, where a(·)
is a decision rule and p(·) is a transfer function.
Theorem 2: Our mechanism {a∗[k],p∗[k]}∞k=0 is dominant
strategy incentive compatible.
Proof: The net-cost in frame k for agent i when reporting
θi[k] versus ri[k] is given by
V (a∗(θˆsji[k] [k]), θi[k])− p∗(θi[k], θˆ−i[k]) =
W˜ (i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))−H(θˆ−i[k])
≤ W˜ (i, (ri[k], θˆ−i[k]))−H(θˆ−i[k])
= V (a∗((ri[k], θˆ−i[k])), θi[k])− p∗(ri[k], θˆ−i[k]),
(19)
where θi is the true type and ri is an arbitrary type; the
equalities hold true due to the definition of value function
and transfer; the last inequality follows by the optimality of
allocation a˜(θi, θˆ−i) in cluster sji[k] maximizes the system
utility from the perspective of agent i. Therefore, in every
frame it is best for agent i to report truthfully and this holds
irrespective of the reports of the other agents.
B. Nature of transfers
We now determine the nature of the transfers that are
required to promote truth-telling. We will show that the
transfers constructed in (11) are always non-negative, i.e., the
system needs to pay the agents in order to participate. In other
words, each agent needs a subsidy to use the system, since it
could simply choose not to participate otherwise. Thus, the
system is not budget-balanced. We will show later how the
savings in B2D usage that results from our system provides
the necessary subsidy in Section X. Given these transfers, we
will also see that our mechanism is individually rational so
that users participate in each frame.
Lemma 3: The transfers defined in (11) are always non-
negative.
Proof: From (11), we have
p∗(θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]) = V (a∗(θˆ[k]), θˆi[k]) (20)
+H(θˆ−i[k])− W˜ (i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))
= V (a∗(θˆ[k]), θˆi[k])− V (a−i(θˆ[k]−i), θˆi[k])
+ W˜−i(i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))− W˜ (i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))
(a)
≥ V (a∗(θˆ[k]), θˆi[k])− V (a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θˆi[k])
(b)
≥ 0.
where (a) follows from the definition of allocation a˜ and the
inequality (b) is true by the monotonicity argument below.
We assume that under both systems (with the allocations
a−i and a∗), the deficits are initialized with the same value.
Also note that all the agents follow the same reporting strategy
in frame k, and hence, χ(a∗) and χ(a−i) can be compared.
Under allocation a−i, agent i never transmits and will pick up
free chunks from other agents’ transmissions. However, agent
i may have to transmit under allocation a∗. Thus, we have
χi(a
∗(θˆ[k]), θi[k]) ≤ χi(a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k]), (21)
as ei[k] + gi(a∗(θˆ[k])) ≤ ei[k] + gi(a−i(θˆ−i[k])) is true for
every k.
Using this we can compare the two deficits by considering
the same allocation policy. For k ≥ 0, we have
di(a
∗(θˆ[k])) =
(
di(a
∗(θˆ[k − 1])) + η − χi(a∗(θˆ[k]), θi[k])
)+
(22)
di(a−i(θˆ−i[k])) =
(
di(a−i(θˆ−i[k − 1])) + η (23)
− χi(a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k])
)+
with χi(a∗(θˆ[k]), θi[k]) ≤ χi(a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k]) for all k,
which implies that di(a∗(θˆ[k])) ≥ di(a−i(θˆ−i[k])). Since the
function V (·, ·) in (10) can be obtained by value iteration
starting with v(·), then by the definition of value function v(·)
and the monotonicity of holding cost function c(·) in d, we
have V (·, ·) being an increasing function in d. Then it directly
follows that
V (a∗(θˆ[k]), θˆi[k]) ≥ V (a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θˆi[k]), (24)
which completes our proof.
The proof of individual rationality follows along the same
lines as Lemma 3.
Lemma 4: Our mechanism {a∗[k],p∗[k]}∞k=0 is individually
rational, i.e., the voluntary participation constraint is satisfied.
Proof: The net-cost in frame k for agent i is given by
V (a∗(θˆsji[k] [k]), θi[k])− p∗(θi[k], θˆ−i[k])
= V (a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k])
− [W˜−i(i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))− W˜ (i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))]
≤ V (a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k]),
(25)
where we use the same logic as point (a) in (20).
We remark that not participating in a frame is equivalent to
free-riding, and our transfers ensure a lower cost is obtained
when participating. However, as the net payment to the users is
non-negative5, we will not immediately have budget-balance.
For the broader class of Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible
mechanism, [18] shows that only under the assumption of
“independent types” (the distribution of each agent’s informa-
tion is not directly affected by the other agents’ information),
budget can be balanced ex-interim. However, in our system,
each agent’s information will have an impact on the other
agents’ information through the allocation. Nevertheless, using
the same technique of an initial sum being placed in escrow
with the expectation that it would be returned at each stage
(i.e,. interim), our system may be budget-balanced. Details
using current prices of B2D service are provided in Section X.
C. Value functions and optimal strategies
We will now show that the value function given by the
solution to (6) is well-defined and can be obtained using
value iteration. Similarly, we will show that both the value
function and the optimal allocation policy from a agent’s
perspective, given by (8) and (9) respectively, exist and can
also be determined via value iteration.
Define operators T1 and T2 by
T1w(θ) =
M∑
i=1
vi(a
∗(θ), θi) + δE {w(Θ)} (26)
T2w˜(1, (θ1,θ−1)) =
min
a
M∑
i′=1
vi′(a, θi′) + δE {w˜(1, (Θ1,Θ−1))|a, θ1}
(27)
using (6) and (8), respectively.
Theorem 5: The following hold:
5While we don’t prove it, we expect the transfer to be positive if the agent
transmits, but we also note that it need not be zero if he doesn’t, owing to
the translation of viewpoints mentioned earlier.
1) There exists a unique W (θ) such that T1W (θ) =
W (θ), and given θ for every w ∈ RM+ , we have
limn→∞ Tn1 w = W (θ);
2) There exists a unique W˜ (1, (θ1,θ−1)) such that
T2W˜ (1, (θ1,θ−1)) = W˜ (1, (θ1,θ−1)), and given
(θ1,θ−1) for every w ∈ RM+ , we have limn→∞ Tn2 w =
W˜ (1, (θ1,θ−1)); and
3) The Markov policy a˜((θ1,θ−1)) obtained from (9) is
an optimal policy to be used in cluster j1[·] from the
viewpoint of agent 1.
Proof: First, we consider statement 1). The proof follows
by applying Theorem 6.10.4 in Puterman [19], and verify-
ing the Assumptions 6.10.1, 6.10.2 and Propositions 6.10.1,
6.10.3.
Define the set of functions
Φ =
{
w : (K,T)M → R+ : sup
θ∈(K,T)M
∣∣∣∣w(θ)α(θ)
∣∣∣∣ <∞
}
(28)
where α(θ) = max{∑Mi vi(a∗(θ), θi), 1}. Note that Φ is a
Banach space with α-norm,
||w||α = sup
θ∈(K,T)M
∣∣∣∣w(θ)α(θ)
∣∣∣∣ <∞ (29)
Also define the operation T1 as
T1w(θ) =
M∑
i=1
vi(a
∗(θ), θi) + δE {w(Θ)} (30)
where w ∈ Φ.
First, we need to show that for ∀w ∈ Φ, T1w ∈ Φ.
From Equation (30) and the definition of value functions,
we know the sum of all users’ values are bounded, say∑M
i=1 vi(a
∗(θ), θi) ≤ A. Then we have
||T1w||α ≤ A+ δE {w(Θ)} (31)
where the rightside expression is bounded by the sum of A
and some multiple of ||w||α. Hence, T1w ∈ Φ.
Next, we need to verify Assumptions 6.10.1 and 6.10.2 in
Puterman [19]. Our theorem requires the verification of the
following three conditions. Let Θ[k] be the random variable
denoting the current system state at frame k, where Θ[k] =
(d[k − 1], e[k]). Then we must show that ∀θ ∈ (K,T)M , for
some constants 0 < γ1 <∞, 0 < γ2 <∞ and 0 < γ3 < 1,
sup
a∈A
|
M∑
i
vi(a
∗(θ), θi)| ≤ γ1α(θ) (32)
Eθ[1][w(θ[1])|θ[0] = θ] ≤ γ2α(θ), ∀w ∈ Φ (33)
βkEθ[k][α(θ[k])|θ[0] = θ] ≤ γ3α(θ), for some k (34)
(32) holds from the definition of α(θ) =
max{∑Mi vi(a∗(θ), θi), 1}.
(33) holds true since
Eθ[1][w(θ[1])|θ[0] = θ] ≤ ||w||α × Eθ[1][α(θ[1])|θ[0] = θ]
≤ ||w||α × γ′2α(θ), for some large enough γ′2
= γ2 × α(θ)
(35)
as we know in our mean field model, θ[1] are all drawn i.i.d.
from the given distribution [⊗ρM ,⊗ζM ], with ρ pertaining to
the deficit, and ζ pertaining to the B2D transmissions received
by that agent, so the first inequality holds in (35).
Finally, we have (34) since,
βkEθ[k][α(θ[k])|θ[0] = θ]
= βkEθ[k][
M∑
i
vi(a
∗(θ[k]), θi)|θ[0] = θ]
≤ βj × γ′3α(θ)
= γ3α(θ)
(36)
The first equality holds from the definition of α(θ), and
the first inequality holds true is because in our mean field
mode, θ[j] are all drawn i.i.d. from the given distribution
[⊗ρM ,⊗ζM ], with ρ pertaining to the deficit, and ζ pertaining
to the B2D transmissions received by that agent, so it’s
identical for all k.
Since we have verified all the three conditions required by
Theorem 6.10.4 in Puterman, Statement 1) holds true.
For statement 2), we can use the same argument as the above
proof to show the existence of fix point. We omit the details
here. The last part of Theorem 5 follows from the discussion
before the statement of this theorem.
V. MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM
In the mean-field setting, assuming the state of every other
agent is drawn i.i.d. with distribution ρ× ζ, the deficit of any
given agent evolves as a Markov chain. We start by showing
that this Markov chain has a stationary distribution. If this
stationary distribution is the same as ρ, then the distribution
ρ is defined as a mean-field equilibrium (MFE); we use the
Schauder fixed point theorem to show the existence of a fixed
point ρ. Using the regenerative representation of the stationary
distribution of deficits given ρ and a strong coupling result,
we prove that the mapping that takes ρ to the stationary
distribution of deficits is continuous using a strong coupling
result. Finally, we show that the set of probability measures to
be considered is convex and compact so that existence follows.
A. Stationary distribution of deficits
Fix a typical agent i and consider the state process
{di[k]}∞k=−1. This is a Markov process in the mean-field
setting: if there is no regeneration, then the deficit changes as
per the allocation and the number of B2D packets received,
and is chosen via the regeneration distribution otherwise. The
allocation is a function of the past di, the number B2D packets
received and the state of the other agents. The number of B2D
packets received and the state of the other agents are chosen
i.i.d in every frame. This Markov process has an invariant
transition kernel. We construct it by first presenting the form
given the past state and the allocations, namely,
P(di[k] ∈ B|di[k − 1] = d, ei[k] = e,a)
= δ1{(
d+ηi−χi(a,(d,e))
)+∈B} + (1− δ)Ψ(B), (37)
where B ⊆ R+ is a Borel set and Ψ is the density function of
the regeneration process for deficit. In the above expression,
the first term corresponds to the event that agent i can either
decode the packet using D2D transmissions or not, and the
second term captures the event that the agent regenerates after
frame k. Using (37) we can define the one-step transition
kernel Υ˜ for the Markov process as
Υ˜(B, d) = P(di[k] ∈ B|di[k − 1] = d)
= δ
∫
1{(
d+ηi−χi(a∗((d,e),θˆ−i),(d,e))
)+∈B}
× d(⊗ρM−1 ×⊗ζM−1)(θˆ−i)dζ(e) + (1− δ)Ψ(B).
(38)
For later use we also define the transition kernel without
regeneration but one obtained by averaging the states of the
other users while retaining the state of user i, i.e.,
Υ(B|d, e) =
P(di[k] ∈ B| no regeneration, di[k − 1] = d, ei[k] = e)
=
∫
1{(
d+ηi−χi(a∗((d,e),θˆ−i),(d,e))
)+∈B}
× d(⊗ρM−1 ×⊗ζM−1)(θˆ−i)dζ(e)
(39)
The k fold iteration of this transition kernel is denoted by
Υ(k).
Lemma 6: The Markov chain where the allocation is de-
termined using (7) based on choosing the states of all users
other than i i.i.d. with distribution ρ × ζ and the number of
B2D packets of user i independently with distribution ζ, and
the transition probabilities in (37) is positive Harris recurrent
and has a unique stationary distribution. We denote the unique
stationary distribution for the deficit of a typical agent by
Πρ×ζ ; the dependence on Ψ is suppressed. The expression
of this stationary distribution Πρ×ζ in term of Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(B|D,E)
is given as,
Πρ×ζ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkEΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)) (40)
where D = {Dk}k∈N is the deficit process, E = {Ek}k∈N is
the B2D packet reception process, and EΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)) =∫
Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(B|d, e)dΨ(d)dζ(e).
Proof: First, from (37), we note the Doeblin condition,
namely,
P(di[k] ∈ B|di[k−1] = d, ei[k] = e,a) ≥ (1−δ)Ψ(B) (41)
where 0 < δ < 1 and Ψ is a probability measure. Then
following the results in Chapter 12 of [20], the Markov chain
with transition probabilities in (37) is positive Harris recurrent
and has a unique stationary distribution.
Next, let −τ be the last time before 0 that regeneration
happened. We have
Πρ×ζ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
P(B, τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
P(B|τ = k)P(τ = k)
(42)
Since the regeneration happens independently of the deficit
queue with inter-regeneration times geometrically distributed
with parameter (1− δ), it follows that P(τ = k) = (1− δ)δk.
Hence
Πρ×ζ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkP(D[0] ∈ B|τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkE(E(1{D[0]∈B}|τ = k,D−k = D,E)|τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkE(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)|τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkEΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E))
(43)
where the last equality holds since D−k ∼ Ψ given τ = k.
B. Agent and cluster decision problems
Suppose that each agent has common information about the
distribution for the deficit ρ ∈ M1(K) (where M1(K) is the
set of probability measures on K); this is one of the mean-field
assumptions. We further assume that ρ ∈ P where
P =
{
ρ|ρ ∈M1(K) with finite mean
}
. (44)
We will also assume that the regeneration distribution Ψ ∈ P .
From Section IV, the best strategy for each agent is to
truthfully reveal its state based on the transfers suggested in
each frame as per (11). Then each cluster simply maximizes
the system value function by choosing the greedy optimal
allocation based on (7).
C. Mean field equilibrium
Given the distribution for deficit ρ and the station distribu-
tion Πρ×ζ , we have the following definition.
Definition 2: (Mean field equilibrium). Let ρ be the common
cumulative distribution for deficit and telling-truth is the
optimal policy for each agent in every frame. Then, we say that
the given ρ along with the truth-telling behavior constitutes a
mean field equilibrium if
ρ(d) = Πρ×ζ(d),∀d ∈ K (45)
VI. EXISTENCE OF MFE
The main result showing the existence of MFE is as follows.
Theorem 7: There exists an MFE of ρ and truth-telling
policy such that ρ(d) = Πρ×ζ(d), ∀d ∈ K.
As mentioned earlier, we will be specializing to the space
M1(K), its subset P and further subsets of P . The primary
topology on M1(K) that we will consider is the uniform
norm topology, i.e., using the l∞ norm given by ‖ρ‖ =
maxd∈K ρ(d). Another topology onM1(K) that we will use is
the point-wise convergence topology, i.e., {ρn}∞n=1 ⊂M1(K)
converges to ρ ∈M1(K) point-wise if limn→∞ ρn(d) = ρ(d)
for all d ∈ K; it is easily verified that the convergence is
the same as weak convergence of measures. Also, define the
mapping Π∗ that takes ρ to the invariant stationary distribution
Πρ×ζ(·). Let P ′ ⊂ P . We will use the Schauder fixed point
theorem to prove existence which is given as follows.
Theorem 8: (Schauder Fixed Point Theorem). Suppose
F(P ′) ⊂ P ′, F is continuous and F(P ′) is contained in a
convex and compact subset of P ′, then F has a fixed point.
Note that from the definition of P , it is already convex.
Then in the following section, we will prove that under the
topology generated by the uniform norm, Π∗ is continuous
and the image of Π∗ for a specific subset P ′ is pre-compact.
Steps to Prove MFE Existence
We first need to prove the continuity of Π∗ with the uniform
norm topology. For this we will start by showing that for any
sequence ρn → ρ with ρn, ρ ∈ P in uniform norm, Π∗(ρn)⇒
Π∗(ρ) (where ⇒ denotes weak convergence). Finally, using
some properties ofM1(K) we will strengthen the convergence
result to prove that Π∗(ρn)→ Π∗(ρ) in uniform norm too.
1) Continuity of the mapping Π∗: We will restrict our
attention to subset of probability measures P(F ) ⊂ M1(K)
such that
P(F ) =
{
ρ ∈M1(K) :
∑
d∈K
dρ(d) ≤ F
}
(46)
where F is a given non-negative constant; in other words,
probability measures with a specified bound on the mean and
not just a finite mean. We will assume that the regeneration
distribution Ψ ∈ P(F ′) for some F ′. Later on we will specify
the values of F and F ′ to be used.
We start with the following preliminary result that estab-
lishes compactness of sets like P(F ) in the uniform norm
topology; note that convexity is immediate.
Lemma 9: Given a sequence of non-negative numbers
{bn}n∈N such that limn→∞ bn = 0, then C =
{
x : |xn| ≤
bn ∀n ∈ N
}
is a compact subset of l∞ and sequences
of elements from C that converge point-wise also converge
uniformly.
Proof: We will establish the second property first. We’re
given a sequence {σn}n∈N ⊂ C that converges point-wise
to σ; it obviously follows that σ ∈ C even with point-wise
convergence so that we are, in fact, showing that C is closed
in l∞ too. Since limn→∞ bn = 0, given  > 0, there exists 6
N such that for all n > N , bn ≤ /2 so that supk∈N |σkn| ≤
bn ≤ /2 too. Since limk→∞ σkn = σn for all n = 1, . . . , N ,
we can find Nn such that for all k > Nn, |σkn − σn| ≤ .
Therefore, for k > max(N,maxn=1,...,N Nn)
|σkn − σn| ≤
{
 n = 1, . . . , N
|σkn|+ |σn| ≤  n > N
(47)
so that ‖σk − σ‖ ≤ .
Since we have already established that C is closed in l∞, it
is sufficient to prove that it is totally bounded as well. Here
6Note the abuse of notation only in this section to use N to represent a
positive integer.
we first find N such that for all n > N , bn ≤  so that
supk∈N |σkn| ≤ bn ≤  too. Then from the compactness of∏N
n=1[−bn, bn] ∈ RN , we can find a finite number of points
{v1, v2, . . . , vL} ⊂ ∏Nn=1[−bn, bn] such that ∏Nn=1[−bn, bn]
is covered by balls of radius  around vl, l = 1, . . . , L. Now
we construct {vˆ1, . . . , vˆL} ∈ C as follows for l = 1, . . . , L
vˆln =
{
vln if n ≤ N
0 otherwise
(48)
By our choice of N , {vˆ1, . . . , vˆL} is a finite cover of C with
balls of radius , proving that C is totally bounded too.
One can also use the Cantor diagonalization procedure to show
sequential compactness in the proof above.
We have an immediate corollary of this result.
Corollary 10: The set of probability measures P(F ) on K
is a compact set of l∞ for every F ∈ R+.
Proof: For any ρ ∈ P(F ), p(d1) ≤ 1 and by Markov’s
inequality for n > 1
p(dn) ≤
∞∑
k=n
p(dk) ≤ F
dn
(49)
with limn→∞ Fdn = 0. Using Lemma 9 the result follows.
Next, we present a coupling result from Thorisson [21,
Theorem 6.1, Chapter 1]. This result will be used in proving
continuity of the stationary distribution of the deficit process
under the topology of point-wise convergence and in strength-
ening the convergence result.
Theorem 11: Let {ρn}∞n=1 ∈ M1(K) converge weakly
to ρ ∈ M1(K), then there exists a coupling, i.e., random
variables {Xn}∞n=1, X on a common probability space and a
random integer N such that Xn ∼ ρn for all n ∈ N, X ∼ ρ
and Xn = X for n ≥ N .
This result shows that weak convergence of probability
measures on K is equivalent to convergence of probability
measures in total variation norm, and hence, also in uniform
norm.
Next we show that Πρ×ζ ∈ P(F ) whenever ρ ∈ P(F ).
Lemma 12: If ρ ∈ P(F ) for F ≥ δη1−δ and the regeneration
distribution Ψ ∈ P(F ′) for F ′ ≤ F − δη1−δ , then the stationary
distribution of the deficit process of any specific user Πρ×ζ ∈
P(F ).
Proof: The proof will involve three steps. The first is to
establish that Πρ×ζ is indeed a probability distribution, which
is obvious. The second is to establish that Πρ×ζ ∈ M1(K),
which will be carried out using induction by analyzing the
properties of the Markov transition kernel of the deficit process
without any regenerations. Finally, using stochastic dominance
we will show that Πp×ζ ∈ P(F ).
From earlier Lemma 6, we know that
Πρ×ζ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkEΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)) (50)
Therefore, for our proof we will show that
EΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|D,E)) ∈M1(K). Since
EΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)) =
∫
Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(B|d, e)dΨ(d)dζ(e), (51)
and Ψ ∈M1(K) and ζ ∈M1(T), it is sufficient to show that
Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(·|d, e) ∈M1(K) for every (d, e) ∈ (K,T).
Since Υ(0)ρ×ζ(·|d, e) is a point-mass at d, the initial con-
dition is satisfied. We now make the induction assumption
that Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|d, e) ∈ M1(K) and show that this implies that
Υ
(k+1)
ρ×ζ (·|d, e) ∈M1(K). Since Υ(k+1)ρ×ζ (·|d, e) is a probability
measure, we only need to show that its support is K. By the
definition of the Markov transition kernel without regenera-
tions, we have
Υ
(k+1)
ρ×ζ (B|d, e)
=
∫ 1∑
j=0
1{(d′+η−j)+∈B}pj(d
′, e′)dΥ(k)(d′|d, e)dζ(e′)
(52)
for some measurable functions {pj(d′, e′)}j=0,1 that account
for the states of the other users being chosen independently
using distribution ρ × ζ and the greedy optimal allocation
function a∗(·). The assertion that Υ(k+1)ρ×ζ (·|d, e) ∈ M1(K)
follows since d′ ∈ K and the only possible updates are an
increase of the deficit to d′ + η or a decrease to either 0 or
d′ + η − 1 (depending on value of d′).
The deficit process for any given user is stochastically
dominated by the fictitious process where the user is never
allowed to decode the contents of a frame during his lifetime,
this is irrespective of his state or the state of the other users.
Denote this process by {D˜k}k∈N; it is easily discerned that
the process takes values in K. The transition kernel for this
process is given by
P(D˜k+1 = d|D˜k = d′) = δ1{d=d′+η} + (1− δ)Ψ(d). (53)
Using the same proof as in Lemma 6, the invariant distribution
Π˜ of the {D˜k}k∈N process is given by
Π˜(d) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δk
∑
d′∈K
Ψ(d′)1{d′+kη=d}. (54)
By the stochastic ordering property, the proof follows by
noting that
EΠρ×ζ [D] ≤ EΠ˜[D]
≤
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δk
∑
d′∈K
Ψ(d′)(d′ + kη)
< F ′ +
δη
1− δ
(55)
Next we show continuity properties of the mapping Π∗.
Theorem 13: The mapping Π∗ : P(F ) 7→ P(F ) is continu-
ous in the uniform topology. In addition, Π∗ has a fixed point
in P(F ).
Proof: We will start by showing that Π∗ is continuous
in the topology of point-wise convergence. For this we will
use the coupling from Theorem 11 to establish convergence
in total variation norm of the Markov transition kernels of
the deficit process without any regenerations. Then using
Lemma 9 we can strengthen the topology to complete the proof
of the first part. The fixed point result then follows from the
Schauder fixed point theorem after noting both the convexity
and compactness of P(F ).
To establish the continuity of Π∗ in the topology of point-
wise convergence, we will start by proving that the Markov
transition kernels without regeneration {Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|d, e)}∞k=0 are
continuous in the topology of point-wise convergence. Since
Υ
(0)
ρ×ζ(·|d, e) is a point-mass at d irrespective of ρ ∈ P(F ), the
continuity assertion holds. In fact, for all n ≥ 1 and d′ ∈ K,
Υ
(0)
ρn×ζ(d
′|d, e) = Υ(0)ρ×ζ(d′|d, e). Let {ρn}n∈N ⊂ P(F ) be a
sequence converging point-wise 7 to ρ ∈ P(F ). We will show
that Υ(k)ρn×ζ(·|d, e) converges point-wise to Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(·|d, e) for all
k ∈ N. We will prove this by induction.
We will refer to any measures and random variables corre-
sponding to ρn as coming from the nth system and those
corresponding to ρ as coming from the limiting system.
We will prove the point-wise convergence of Υ(k)ρn×ζ(·|d, e)
converges point-wise to Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|d, e) for all k ∈ N using the
metric given by the total variation norm. Following Lindvall
[22], the total variation norm distance between two probability
measures µ and ν on a countable measurable probability space
Ω is given by
dTV (µ, ν) =
1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
∣∣µ(ω)− ν(ω)∣∣
= inf{P(X 6= Y ) : r.v.s X,Y s.t. X ∼ µ and Y ∼ ν},
(56)
where the infimum is over all couplings or joint distributions
such that the marginals are given by µ and ν, respectively;
the second definition applies more generally while the first is
restricted to countable spaces.
For ease of exposition we will denote by 1 the user
whose deficit varies as per the Markov transition kernel
Υ
(k)
•×ζ(·|d, e) and the remaining users in the cluster by indices
{2, 3, . . . ,M}. For the nth system and in the limiting system,
in every frame the B2D component of the state of every
user (including 1) is chosen i.i.d. with distribution ζ. We will
couple all the systems under consideration such that the B2D
component of the state is exactly the same; denote the random
vector by E with components El for l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. For
users l ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,M} the deficit is chosen independently
via distribution ρn in the nth system and via distribution ρ in
the limit system. Since ρn converges to ρ point-wise, using
Theorem 11 we can find a coupling {X˜ ln}n∈N, X˜ l and an a.s.
finite random integer N˜l for l ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,M} such that for
n ≥ N˜ l, X˜ ln = X˜ l.
Next by the induction hypothesis let Υ(k)ρn×ζ(·|d, e) converge
point-wise to Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|d, e) for some k ∈ N, once again by
7By Lemma 9, this convergence also holds in l∞.
Theorem 11, there exists a coupling {Xn}n∈N, X and an a.s.
finite random variable Nk ∈ N such that Xn ∼ Υ(k)ρn×ζ(·|d, e)
for all n ∈ N, X ∼ Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|d, e) and Xn = X for all n ≥ Nk.
With these definitions in place, further define the following
Dk+1n =(
Xn + η − χ1
(
a∗
((
(Xn, E1), (X˜
2
n, E2), . . . , (X˜
M
n , EM )
))
,
((
(Xn, E1), (X˜
2
n, E2), . . . , (X˜
M
n , EM )
))))
+
(57)
Dk+1 =(
X + η − χ1
(
a∗
((
(X,E1), (X˜
2, E2), . . . , (X˜
M , EM )
))
,
((
(X,E1), (X˜
2, E2), . . . , (X˜
M , EM )
))))
+
,
(58)
where we have taken care to explicitly spell out the states of
all the users involved.
Then Dk+1n is a random variable distributed
as Υ(k+1)ρn×ζ (·|d, e) and Dk+1 is a random variable
distributed as Υ(k+1)ρ×ζ (·|d, e). Furthermore, for
n ≥ Nˆ := max(Nk, N˜2, . . . , N˜M ), we have Xn = X ,
X˜ ln = X˜
l for l ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,M}. The last statement then
implies that Dk+1n = D
k+1 for n ≥ Nˆ . Therefore, it follows
that
{ω : Dk+1n 6= Dk+1} ⊂ {w : Nˆ > n}, (59)
so that
dTV
(
Υ
(k+1)
ρn×ζ (·|d, e),Υ
(k+1)
ρ×ζ (·|d, e)
)
≤ P(Dk+1n 6= Dk+1)
≤ P(Nˆ > n)
(60)
which converges 8 to 0 as n→∞ by the a.s. finiteness of Nˆ .
From the definition of the metric dTV (·, ·), it is follows that
Υ
(k+1)
ρn×ζ (·|d, e) converges to Υ
(k+1)
ρ×ζ (·|d, e) in l1, and so both
in l∞ and point-wise also.
Having established the basic convergence result,
EΨ(Υ(k)ρn×ζ(·|D,E)) converges point-wise to
EΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|D,E)) for every k ∈ {0} ∪ N by using the
bounded convergence theorem since we are averaging
probability distributions. Additionally, again using the
bounded convergence theorem, Πρn×ζ(·) converges point-
wise to Πρ×ζ(·).
Theorem 14: The MFE is unique.
Proof: Suppose there exist two MFE, namely ρ1 and ρ2.
Consider a generic agent 1. Agent 1 has a belief that the
other agents in the same cluster will draw their states from
ρ1 or ρ2 for deficits and ζ for B2D transmissions in an i.i.d.
fashion. We assume that each agent has the same realization
8Note that this yields a rate of convergence result as well.
of B2D packets received under these two deficit distributions.
Given this belief and our incentive compatible mechanism
(that determines transfers as a fucntion of the belief), all the
agents in this cluster will truthfully reveal their states, i.e.,
the B2D term will be the same no matter whether the belief
is ρ1 or ρ2. By Algorithm 1, this will result in the same
deficit update for agent 1. Therefore, given the truth-telling
mechanism and the unique policy, we achieve a unique MFE,
i.e., ρ1 = ρ2.
We end with a few remarks on generalizing the D2D
transmission model. As mentioned earlier, we constrain our
analysis to the case of D2D transmissions being error-free
even though errors can occur in practice. Also, in our im-
plementation we follow the WiFi distributed coordination
function (DCF). We will now describe at a high-level how
both the incentive mechanism and the existence of the mean-
field equilibrium hold under both these scenarios. We will
start with the incentive mechanism. Here the exact same logic
holds, except that the transition kernels for the user deficits are
much more involved so that calculating the system-optimum
policy and value function from the user’s perspective becomes
harder. Next we discuss whether a mean-field equilibrium
exists or not. The main technical challenge again would
be to show the continuity properties to apply the Schauder
fixed point theorem. For the scenario with D2D transmissions
with errors, we will endow each of the user with T error
sequences9 for each frame corresponding to the maximum
possible transmissions to be made by the user. For the purposes
of demonstrating continuity, we will then couple systems by
insisting on these error sequences being exactly the same. For
the scenario with the WiFi DCF, we will endow each user
with T countdown timer values, again corresponding to the
maximum possible transmissions made by the user. Again we
will couple systems by insisting on these countdown timers
being exactly the same. With the two coupling ideas in the
place, we can then use the same ideas as our proof above
to show the continuity and the existence of a mean-field
equilibrium. Note that we can also combine D2D transmissions
with the WiFi DCF. We omit the exact details of these proofs
in the interests of brevity.
VII. PASSAGE TO THE MEAN FIELD LIMIT
We gave an overview of the finite agent system in Sections I
(description of FiniteDPM) and III. Here, we briefly discuss
the passage between the finite agent system and the mean field
model that we have used throughout the paper. As in other
literature on repeated games under the mean field setup [15],
[16], we have considered the system with an infinitely large
number of agents at finite time. It is straight-forward to follow
the steps in [15], [16] to prove convergence of the finite agent
system to the mean-field model in our context. However, to the
best of our knowledge, the study of mean field games as time
also becomes infinitely large is currently open. There has been
9Each of these error sequences would list which of the other users receive
the D2D chunk.
recent work in non-game-theoretical settings (using a fixed
policy) studying the question of the conditions required to
ensure that the mean field model is indeed the limiting case of
the finite system when time becomes asymptotically large [23],
[24]. In the case of our system, the set of measures that we
consider is tight, since they are all stochastically dominated by
a fictitious system in which no D2D transmissions happen and
the agents’ deficits simply increase and then they regenerate.
Furthermore, we showed in Theorem 14 that the MFE, which
is efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible and per-
period individually rational, is unique. We believe that these
two properties might aid us in characterizing the equilibrium
as time becomes large, and we defer this problem to future
work.
VIII. VALUE DETERMINATION
We now turn to computing the system value from the
viewpoint of a cluster and also a typical agent (say 1). Here, we
suppose there are M = 4 agents in each cluster, and all have
η = 0.95, δ = 0.9995. Hence, each agent spends an average
of 2000 frames in the system before leaving. A new agent has
a deficit drawn uniformly at random from the interval [0, 13].
Each agent needs to receive N = 10 packets to decode the
block, and there are T = 8 time slots in each frame. We wish
to determine the value function from the perspective of the
cluster and from the perspective of agent 1, using (6) and (8).
The following observation is useful to determine the alloca-
tions a∗ and a˜. It is straightforward to find a∗, since it simply
follows Algorithm 1. Now, consider a˜. It is simple to see that
it too would follow Phases 1 and 2 of Algorithm 1. Then,
from the perspective of agent 1, after the completion of these
two phases, there are only two classes of allocations–those in
which he transmits and those in which he does not. Now, since
all the other agents that agent 1 comes in contact with in the
future are drawn from [⊗ρM−1,⊗ζM−1], the allocation should
follow a greedy minimization with respect to the other agents.
Thus, we only need consider two allocations while conducting
value iterations: min-deficit-first with agent 1 (identical to
Phase 3 of Algorithm 1) and min-deficit-first without agent
1 (just set aside agent 1 in Phase 3 of Algorithm 1).
We first run the system according to Algorithm 1, and use
the results to find the empirical deficit distribution, denoted by
R. This is identical to the Mean Field deficit distribution. The
empirical distribution of deficit R, is shown in Figure 4. We
find that deficit lies in the range 0− 13.
With η = 0.95, the (countable) deficit set is
{0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, ...}. With a deficit range of 0 − 13, there
are totally 260 potential values for deficit. For the number of
B2D chunks received e, we take values 3, 4 and 5 (uniformly).
Therefore, there are totally 2604 × 34 states in the system.
Using R to represent the MF deficit distribution, and a linear
holding cost function, we run value iteration; we present an
example for a few states in Figure 5. We thus obtain the mean
field value functions.
The empirical distribution of the average discounted trans-
fers over the lifetime of each device is shown in Figure 6.
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The average transfer is 18039. We will discuss the economic
implications of this observation after describing the Android
experiments in the next section.
IX. ANDROID IMPLEMENTATION
We now describe experiments on an Android testbed using
a cluster size of four Google Nexus 7 tablets. We modified the
kernel of Android v 4.3 to simultaneously allow both WiFi and
3G interfaces to transmit and receive data.
Our system consists of a server application on a desktop
that codes data and sends it to the tablets over the Internet, an
Android app that receives data over Internet on a 3G interface
and shares it over the WiFi interface, and a monitor that keeps
track of the state of the system and generates a trace of events.
The server initializes each tablet in the system with a randomly
selected number of chunks. Additionally, churn is emulated
in the system by making the application on the tablet reset
randomly with a probability δ¯ = 5× 10−4 (i.e., δ = 0.9995).
We set the frame duration as 500 ms. Since we have
δ = 0.9995, this means that the average duration that a
device spends in the system is 1000 seconds. We use an
MP3 music file as the data, and divide it into blocks, with
the blocks being further divided into chunks. Chunks are
generated using an open source random linear coding library
[25], using field size 256 and 10 degrees of freedom per block.
Hence, a block is decodable with high probability if 10 chunks
are received successfully. Each chunk has an average size of
1500 Bytes, and has a header that contains the frame number
it corresponds to as well as its current deficit. The system
maintains synchronization by observing these frame numbers.
The allocation algorithm proceeds as suggested by Algo-
rithm 1. We approximate the three phases by setting back-
off times for D2D access. Devices that cannot complete (i.e.,
Phase 1 devices) should be the most aggressive in D2D
channel access. We set them to randomly back-off between
1 and 5 ms before transmission. Devices that can afford to
transmit some number of chunks (Phase 2) should be less
aggressive, and transmit chunks by backing off between 1 and
15 ms. Finally, each device enters Phase 3, and modulates its
aggressiveness based on deficits. Each device normalizes its
deficit based on the values of deficits that it sees from all other
transmissions, and backsoff proportional to this deficit within
the interval of 5 to 15 ms. The average error in value due to
a back-off based implementation is about 10− 15%.
We conducted experiments to determine the stable delivery
ratio achieved using D2D for different B2D initializations per
frame. We present some sample deficit trajectories in Figure 7.
The random resets emulating peer churn are visible as sharp
changes in the deficit. We found that on average, B2D transfer
of 4 chunks to each device is sufficient to ensure a delivery
ratio of over 0.95. Hence, it is easy to achieve a 60% reduction
in B2D usage, while maintaining a high QoE.
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Fig. 7. Sample deficit trajectories. We have used δ = 0.98 in this run to
illustrate frequent resets, which cause sharp decreases or increases.
X. SYSTEM VIABILITY
We saw in Section VIII that the average transfer to each
agent is positive, meaning that the agents need to obtain
some kind of subsidy in order to use the system. What kind
of subsidy should they be given? The Android experiments
indicate that each agent is able to save 60% of the B2D costs
when participating in the system. Would this be sufficient?
The price of B2D service is currently $10 per GB across
many US cellular providers. Suppose that we consider music
streaming at a rate of 250 kbps corresponding to our Android
system. If each device uses only B2D communication (no D2D
at all), the cost of spending 1000 seconds in the sytem is 31.25
cents. The per frame communication cost is 0.0156 cents, and
we can consider this to be the value of each frame to the agent.
The experiments in Section IX indicate that the agents
have to utilize their B2D connection for at least 40% of the
chunks to maintain the desired QoE. Hence, the value that can
potentially be received by participating in the D2D system is
0.6 × 0.0156 = 0.00936 cents per frame. Let us assume a
linear deficit cost function that takes a value of 0.00936 cents
at deficit value of 15. In other words, if the agent were to
experience a deficit of 15 or above in a frame, it gets no
payoff from that frame. Using this linear transformation, we
can translate the average transfer of 18039 (the value found
in Section VIII) over the entire 1000 seconds into a total of
11.26 cents. Thus, if each agent saves at least 11.26 cents, it
has an incentive to participate in the D2D system. The actual
saving is 0.6 ∗ 31.25 = 18.75 cents (60% of the B2D costs)
per agent, which is well above the minimum required saving.
The situation is still better for video streaming at a rate
of 800 kbps. A similar calculation indicates that a 16 minute
video costs about $1 using pure B2D, while the B2D cost in
the hybrid system is only 40 cents, yielding a savings of 60
cents per agent. However, a saving of about 36 cents per agent
is all that is needed to incentivize them to participate.
In a full implementation, each agent would place an amount
(eg. 36 cents for a 16 minute average lifetime) in escrow
with the monitor upon connecting. Each agent would receive
transfers according to our mechanism, and, on average, would
receive its amount back from the monitor for its contributions.
Hence, the system would then be ex-ante budget balanced.
XI. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of providing incentives for co-
operation in large scale multi-agent systems, using wireless
streaming networks as an example. The objective was to
incentivize truth telling about individual user states so that
a system wide cost minimizing allocation can be used. We
showed how a mean field approximation for large systems
yields a low-complexity framework under which to design the
mechanism. Finally, we implemented the system on Android
devices and presented results illustrating its viability using the
current price of cellular data access as the basis for transfers.
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